On radar, this month, Israel and Lebanon have set an important milestone in their relations that could help prevent another war in the north. After nearly a decade of US efforts, US envoy David Satterfield convinced the two countries to use a tripartite forum with the United States to form the maritime borders between them.
Down the road, the talks were designed to allow Lebanese to explore natural gas in the Mediterranean; Beirut hopes to raise its energy economy as Israel did a few years ago.
Talks will begin at the end of this month at the UNIFIL base in Naqoura, just north of the Israeli border. They will mainly be about a gas field in which the two countries disagree about their borders.
The debate includes the land border, where 13 points are still controversial. Beirut’s willingness to negotiate directly on the maritime border after many years of refusal to do so is largely based on economic considerations. The withdrawal of hundreds of thousands of refugees from the Syrian civil war has put a huge burden on Lebanon, which will facilitate the discovery of natural gas. Such conversations would not be possible without the green light of Hezbollah that he gave for these reasons.
According to Israeli intelligence, Iran’s financial support to Hezbollah has fallen from $ 1 billion to $ 600 million annually due to US sanctions. The organization recently launched a massive funding campaign through billboards to overcome the budget crisis. Perhaps Hezbollah hopes to gain its share of a future gas deal as a key partner in the Lebanese parliament.
The decision to negotiate to determine the maritime border contrasts sharply with both the Israeli Defense Forces and Hezbollah’s public discourse, a conflict that often focuses on threat changes. In a speech earlier this month, Hezbollah leader Hasan Nasrallah said that if a war between the United States and Iran erupted, it would ignite a conflict in the entire region and pay Israel.
This week, an annual commemoration ceremony was held for Israeli soldiers who died in the Second Lebanon War. In his speech at the ceremony, the new Northern Command chief Amir Baram mentioned Nasrallah’s recent announcements of “encouragement and screaming – -“ everything, I tell you as a result of great stress. ”A few days ago, Military Intelligence Chief Tamir Hayman said in a speech at a gun exhibition in Tel Aviv: ız We don’t need Nasrallah to tell us what the status of Hezbollah’s rocket accuracy project is. We know you look better than where you are. ”God only knows that in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Israeli generals with kindergarten children should once again be pushed by Nasrallah to make prideful threats. Eisenkot and the northThe speeches and newspaper articles before the third Lebanon warfare part of the psychological war between the parties.
Mutual deterrence works quite well. Almost 13 years have passed since the last war, a disappointing bond with many casualties on both sides that helped dissolve the next outbreak.
The war in 2006 surprised Hezbollah, who did not expect Israel to react greatly to the abduction of soldiers, Ehud Goldwasser and Eldad Regev. It also surprised Iran, where the abduction was not previously coordinated. On the assumption that a future war in Tehran will be decided, it is seen that the silence continues more than that of Hezbollah in Beirut and reflects the Iranian agenda.
After the war and until 2012, Hezbollah’s huge rocket stock was built mainly to serve as Iran’s second strike capability if Israel attacked nuclear zones for the first time. When the danger to its nuclear areas was reduced, Tehran focused on rescuing the Assad regime in Syria. About one-third of Hezbollah’s surviving army was sent to the Syrian civil war, where Iran had ordered about 2,000 dead. In such cases, Iran and Hezbollah had nothing to do with a military conflict with Israel.
Things changed last year. Hezbollah’s troops returned after the Syrian regime’s victory in the civil war (which is still limited in the northern Idlib region). Nevertheless, the discussions on the maritime border and the enormous potential of gas exploration is an important issue against another military report in which the Lebanese economy will suffer severely. The danger of war remains, but mainly as a derivative of other fronts: the tension in the Gulf between Iran and the United States, and Israel’s campaign to fight Iran’s military arms in Syria. Examination of Hezbollah the beginning of the second week of the Second Lebanon War, a unit of the elite Maglan force set out to capture Givat Shaked, a former IDF position abandoned in May 2000 by withdrawing from southern Lebanon. General information of trenches observed on the back. They did not know that Hezbollah was building an outpost based on underground shelters.
There, in one battle, two IDF soldiers and five Hezbollah fighters were killed. In retrospect, it turned out that Israeli intelligence had detailed knowledge of Hezbollah’s capabilities, including Shaked. But intelligence people were afraid of information leakage – and very relevant intelligence was kept in unopened chests when the war began.
According to the IDF, the war was a major disappointment, a long chain of trauma that gave lectures. One of these courses is about the establishment of the “Study Hall in the Galilee Formation (Chapter 91) about six years ago. This is a kind of intelligence school on Hezbollah’s research for all officers appointed to the Lebanese sector at any time or about to be sent there in case of emergency. Many classification restrictions have been removed to ensure that officers receive maximum information about the enemy.
The department’s intelligence officer, Colonel Y., told Haaretz that ıthe scope of the information depends on the assignment and rank of the officers. We take raw intelligence and adapt it to the needs of the commanders without revealing the source. For us, this is a maturation process that provides more clarity in the transmission of information. “He says the current risk is the exact opposite of 2006: We need to be careful to fill them with too much intelligence; instead, we give the commanders the information they need.
Tell the commanders: The infrastructure of this information, how to use it in an emergency, and the information systems at your disposal. You also let them know: here is a closed window with more confidential information that will only be available to you during the war. “Each year, the working hall, headed by a master intelligence agency, held about 280 meetings with IDF officers.
Each brigade commander whose unit is included in the operational plans of the Northern Command comes with officers twice a year. The officers also answer the soldiers’ questions about Hezbollah. Approximately 700 answers are sent each year, and the office promises to answer every question within a few days – if it is authorized to recruit soldiers.
In the coming months, the IDF, in partnership with a civilian company, launched a simulator that simulates a war with Hezbollah (a similar system is already under preparation for war in Gaza). “In 2006, we didn’t have anything similar to this system, says the intelligence officer.